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Approved For Release 2003/06/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400100017-0

REK

26 April 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

SUBJECT: A Conversation with Jim Angleton

At lunch today I discussed a number of subjects with Angleton.

1. Biographic Intelligence

I told Angleton that after talking with [] and Harvey I had not been able to identify the biographic problem in respect to counter-espionage. I said I was aware that both Mr. Dulles and he felt this should be gone into. I indicated that from [] and Harvey I got the impression that the thing that is needed mainly is more personnel.

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He pointed out that there are a great many investigative agencies in the Government which must be queried with respect to the name check: O/SO, FBI, State, I&S, ONI, Army, Air, Customs, Immigration, Commerce, etc., ad infinitum. I pointed out that it was obvious his ideal would be that there could be a single name check in which all the necessary data would tumble forth. I wondered, however, whether he couldn't be more precise in terms of how one approaches the question realistically. Thus, I asked, what were the four most important agencies (answer: FBI, O/SO, State, ONI), and whether he considered it was at all practical to expect, particularly the FBI, to permit a central card file in O/SO (which is the place he said it should be located)? His response was so weak as to hardly warrant an attack on the problem. At most it seems to me one could begin on this by working on ONI and State.

2. Relations with FBI

I recalled that DeLoach had mentioned that relations with O/SO were fine, that [] and Angleton had reported relations with FBI were lousy. What, I asked, were the problems which he saw? From a discursive monologue I concluded the following:

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a. It is very irritating to AD/SO that all of its desk to desk contacts with FBI have to flow through the centralized liaison service in the form of DeLoach. This is characterized by DeLoach's presence at any meeting between O/SO and FBI desk personnel.

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b. He said that there are about 200 pieces of paper a week flowing between O/SO and FBI, but he did not say that these were not handled satisfactorily. I inquired whether there had been a recommendation from O/SO to the Director for action vis-a-vis FBI. It became clear that they had not been able to get correspondence past [] for the DCI to sign to the FBI, that actually it was considered in the Agency that taking on Mr. Hoover was really too big a problem.

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On this point we concluded that the only approach was in the specific case and my own impressions that for the moment this one is too obscure or tough for me to handle.

3. CP Apparatus

We agreed that he would inform me whether his original memorandum is the one which he wants me to push forward to the Director after such consultations as I think are necessary with O/CI and State on the Communist Trends question. He showed an inclination, however, not to bring it to the Director's attention, but to rather proceed to beef up a research element in O/SO and do the job themselves. I called attention to the thought that if this is done it should be done wittingly with the knowledge of the Director since it is the assignment of a research function to O/SO, and I said that it had been constantly brought to my attention by O/SO that it wished to do no research since it was not a research organization. He said they would probably not prefer to do this since under their charter they have freedom to do anything they consider necessary.

4. I invited his advice with respect to my relations with the people in O/SO on the basis of any comments coming to him, indicating that I would consider such to be very helpful. He indicated favorable reaction but a moment later pointed to the fact that I had been dealing

25X1 25X1 with [] instead of []. Here he was inconsistent in that he
25X1 deprecated [] ability to deal with these problems because he had

no operational experience, and at the same time touted []
25X1 capability, even though [] has had none either. He seemed to hang
25X1 this point on the fact that [] actually had relations with the division
25X1 chiefs where [] didn't. I indicated that I would take his advice and
25X1 establish my contacts with [].

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In this connection I pointed to the difficulty of really getting at the problem of evaluations, for example, because I had no appreciation of what was in the mind of the administrators in each division with respect to the field. Since he had been in the field I asked him whether he could speak to the question of the value or adequacy of O/SO administrative guidance. He indicated it was lousy. I pointed out that it would be most wasteful to try to make the bureaucratic machine grind on trying to get coordinated requirements prioritized when, as a matter of fact, there was inadequate guidance.

At one point he indicated that one of O/SO's difficulties had been that it had no umbilical cord into the Agency. I got the impression that in a minor degree he considered me as offering that possibility, that also O/SO itself had not been too desirous in the past of having a relationship.

JAMES Q. REBER

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REMARKS: I send you the attached Memorandum of Conversation as a matter which I think is clearly in your field for action. My suggestion for what might be more effective is set forth in paragraph 4.

JQR

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